## Militarization Critique

### OFF

#### The “mater narrative” of cybersecurity as an existential threat moves power to the State---cyber politics becomes “war by other means.”

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5.1. “Perpetuall feare”

Cyber security is often characterised as fearful, with cyber threats being both permanent and evolving (Ehrlicher, 2021), and cyber attacks being seen as inevitable (Pearlson et al., 2021). The businesses in our study seemed to agree, with cyber threat appearing to be normalised. Participants, both CISO and non-CISO, considered these threats to be enduring and businesses needed to accept that they would be compromised. This implies a “perpetuall cyber warre” (Stevens, 2016, p. 120). These businesses existed in “continuall feare” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 186), threatened by “death, poverty, or other calamity” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 169) arising from something, i.e, cyber security, that was not well understood, even mystical,18 as “perpetuall feare, [is] always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 169-70).19 The role of the CISO may be valued as one “that can make the Holy Water” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 692) that provides protection from fearful things, and, therefore, is motivated to maintain the fear and dread that underpins their value.20

Survival was clearly a concern for these businesses. Cyber security was positioned as a threat to viability by many of these organisations, with fear of regulatory action and associated fines and reputational damage in particular being a prime concern. Such concerns with viability and survival, arguably the primary motivation for businesses (Beer, 1979), are analogous with seeking to avoid punishment that could lead to “pain, and disability” and, ultimately, “death” (Gert, 2001, p. 243). The punishments they sought to avoid were enacted by the larger Leviathan of the state and, as mini-Leviathans, these businesses cascaded this concept, instituting their own mechanisms of punishment for their employees, as we discuss below. Internal experts were positioned by many of these organisations as “guards” that protected them against the various harms that they faced. Cyber security functions were seen as assuagement against threats to business viability and helped these businesses to manage the uncertainty they experienced as a result of these threats and ensure their continued survival. This allowed them to shape their future to a certain extent, aligning with Hobbes’ encouragements towards continued attentiveness to threats (Stevens, 2016), but also provided a resource that articulated and predicted those threats, based on both past, and imagined future, events.

5.1.1. Permanent cyber emergency

Many of these organisations played a role in national cyber security, including participating in invitation-only national security working groups. Such fora, in which government intelligence services share details of cyber threats with specific industries, demonstrate the role that governments play in maintaining a state of permanent cyber emergency. They provide a mechanism through which governments can both maintain fear and amplify it. This could be achieved through exaggeration or even fabrication, particularly when considering the reliance of the state Leviathan on the persistence of this fear.21

A permanent emergency offers benefits as a “master narrative” (Smith and Sparkes, 2008, p. 18) that can be invoked to support actions taken by businesses and individuals within that business, whether to justify investment or to justify restrictive controls such as surveillance, as we discuss in Section 5.3. The positioning of cyber security as warfare, which is a narrative repeated by both media and governments (Stevens, 2016), establishes that concept in the minds of all parties to that war, whether attacker or attacked. Adversaries, or even just those who disagree, will respond to the narrative of cyber security-as-war and then treat it as such, focusing on attack and defence, rather than seeing it as anything else, for example, as a collective problem of identifying and addressing weaknesses that threaten all. This could lead to actions that have unintended consequences, such as state purchasing, and hoarding, of vulnerabilities, e.g. Hoeksma (2017). Cyber security-as-collective-problem could be considered a “flattened narrative” (Farley, 2001), with preference instead provided to the cyber security-as-war concept which supports the maintenance of existing power structures. This can also be considered as indexing a “meta-narrative” (Symon et al., 2014, p. 3) of existing or ‘traditional’ enemies (Stevens, 2016), and the “superiority of ...the West” (Neocleous, 2008, p. 172), as suggested by the references to (ex-)communist states22 observed in the data. There is an almost paradoxical relevance of both Foucault’s and von Clausewitz’s perspectives on war, with cyber war being a “mere continuation of policy by other means” (von Clausewitz, 1873, p. 12) and cyber politics being “the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault, 2004, p. 15).23 Each of these also provides economic benefits (Neocleous, 2008), as we discuss below.

Positioning cyber security as an existential threat, as a war with “apocalyptic” (Stevens, 2016, p 121) consequences, may also allow for exceptionalism and deviance from existing laws, both national and supranational. Hobbes explicitly permitted defiance of law if motivated “by the terrour of present death” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 345). Such exceptionalism based on existential threat can be observed in modern societies, e.g. Government, Government; USA (2001), including in relation to cyber security threats (Walker, 2006). References to national security also connect with this warfare motif. As the nation is ‘under threat’ then there is a collective sense of conflict and, therefore, a suggestion that everyone has to play their part.

The fear generated by these threats propels citizens into “the waiting arms of whoever might be ruling” (Chapman, 1975, p. 88). Such fear may be a “necessity-justification” (Chapman, 1975, p. 89) for enduring power, and, as Chapman suggests, it is straightforward to conceive of such “justification ...[occurring] at the state level, as a function of real or manufactured inter-state crises” (Chapman, 1975, p. 89), particularly with regard to threats that are hard to understand or somewhat ephemeral in nature, such as those related to cyber security. If cyber-security threats result in fearful and bewildered citizens, those citizens are easier to moderate. Educating citizens on, or even communicating the existence of, cyber threats may couple “paranoia with pacification” (Chapman, 1975, p. 90).

Businesses that publicly articulate their cyber-security capability, through references to the existence of dedicated personnel and the actions they are taking to mitigate cyber risk, are demonstrating their strength and their readiness for war in a “calculated presentation” (Foucault, 2004, p. 92). Such pronouncements, particularly in annual reports, also serve to maintain the organisation’s power by “memorializ[ing]” what the organisation has achieved, arguably also creating “an obligation” (Foucault, 2004, p. 67) for future leaders of that organisation.

5.1.2. Cyber discourse

The collocation of certain words observed in the data, e.g. ‘sophisticated’ and ‘threat’, which are also seen in broader cyber-security discourse, e.g., Noonan (2021), may carry “encoded ideologies” (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006, p. 113) that also serve to maintain power structures. References to ‘nation state’ alongside ‘cyber threat’ carry an association of war being waged, particularly by previously established ‘enemies of the West’. As “packaged, homogenized violence” (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 160), such references not only maintain hegemonical power (‘we’ are threatened by ‘them’ therefore we must take action) but also provides a means by which citizens are mollified, arguably even tranqullised, as well as driving consumption (Baudrillard, 1998), as we discuss in Section 5.3.

Hobbes saw the importance of the Leviathan having control over language. By maintaining discourse that defines, or repeats, who and what are threats, and the relative urgency of those threats, the state can maintain broader narratives of fear, war, friend and enemy, good and bad, and right and wrong. Such narratives in connection with cyber security featured in our data but, in particular, the articulation of cyber threats in moral terms was consistent. A moral association may strengthen the power and importance of these threats for citizens but also result in unquestioning acceptance of those positions. Although morality may (arguably) be subjective (Zimmerman, 2006),24 it may be experienced objectively in everyday life (Hofmann et al., 2014) and, therefore, by assigning a moral dimension to cyber security, citizens may be discouraged from challenging the ‘need’ for intrusive controls associated with it.

The use of specialist cyber-security language, which is inaccessible to non-specialists, provides power to those that can understand it, and this power is increased when there is an interpretation being provided. An interpretation provides an opportunity, conscious or unconscious, to imbue its translation with other meanings, whether moral, political or emotional. Language is a means by which reality is both experienced and constructed (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006), with those who have the power to interpret specialist or ‘foreign’ language also having the power to construct reality for their audience. Cyber security may offer a channel through which sentiments and beliefs that are beneficial to the Leviathan can be established and maintained, such as those relating to ‘enemy threats’ or those relating to ‘security versus privacy’, a questionable dualism (Neocleous, 2008) that we discuss below.

Cyber security in both academic and mass media communication abounds with military tropes, e.g. Bond (2018); Corera (2017); Kanniainen (2019); Limnéll (2016) and many metaphors of war were observed throughout our data. Such militaristic references may be motivated by a desire for those who work in cyber security, most of whom are male (Peacock and Irons, 2017),25 to cast themselves as heroic, a masculine trait that is strongly Hobbesian (Di Stefano, 1983). The perception of always being ‘at war’ from a cyber-security perspective, besides the ontological ‘comfort’ this may provide Mitzen (2006), may also be motivated by a masculine desire for such valorous narratives, demonstrating masculinity through “metaphor, and bravado” (Carver, 2014, p. 115). Such language may also be deeply performative (Butler, 2002 (1990; Carver, 2014). Cyber security professionals may possess a distinctive and exceptional “power” that helps form their heroic identity, namely “knowledge” and “right method” (Di Stefano, 1983, p. 642) which represents “the requisite special weapon of the epic hero” (Di Stefano, 1983, p. 642), and, similar to Hobbes’ self-conception as heroic, cyber-security professionals may be “proposing a solution to a predicament that [is] more masculine than human in tenor” (Di Stefano, 1983, p. 643).

#### Securitized governmentality justifies extinction in the name of saving life.

Michael Dillon 96. University of Lancaster. “Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought”.

The way of sharpening and focusing this thought into a precise question is first provided, however, by referring back to Foucault; for whom Heidegger was the philosopher. Of all recent thinkers, Foucault was amongst the most committed to the task of writing the history of the present in the light of the history of philosophy as metaphysics. 4 That is why, when first thinking about the prominence of security in modern politics, I first found Foucault’s mode of questioning so stimulating. There was, it seemed to me, a parallel to be drawn between what he saw the technology of disciplinary power/knowledge doing to the body and what the principle of security does to politics.

What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account—amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance—for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter. 5 A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.

#### The alternative is abolition---reject militarized framing that responds to threats with violence for a movement of international solidarity.

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People-centred solutions for peace

Beyond this immediate context, action is needed to prevent future armed conflict and threats of nuclear war.

Instead of maintaining opposing military alliances, all parties should engage in building a common, demilitarised security strategy that places cooperation and the collective fulfilment of the needs of people and planet in the forefront of all policies and actions. NATO, for example, should be disbanded and non-militarised, non-divisive alliances for peace and cooperation should be built instead, with international solidarity as its guiding principle. All countries should reduce their military spending immediately, and agree to phased reductions through the implementation of Article 26 of the UN Charter, the mandate for which should be taken from the UN Security Council and given to the UN General Assembly.

All countries should join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and work urgently for the timebound elimination of all nuclear weapons. Through the treaty’s provisions for disarmament, the elimination of nucelar weapons could be pursued through verifiable process and achieved within a decade. The process of nuclear weapon abolition could provide a foundational path to broader changes in the world order. Eliminating nuclear weapons would help establish a new cooperative paradigm in international relations and free up resources help address the climate crisis. It would also help generate momentum for broader disarmament and demilitarisation and redirection of money and human ingenuity towards meeting human and planetary needs.

At the core of our efforts, we must put the lives of civilians and care for the planet above perceived military, political, and economic interests. To this end, a people-centred peace process is imperative. As Almut Rochowanaski writes, “We must apply the lessons of 21st-century peacebuilding to create a peace process that is people-centred, women-led and rights-based.” Without this, “patterns of exclusion and victimisation will not be remedied, and memories of pain and injustice will turn into grievance and alienation lasting generations. A broad range of stakeholders can be heard and validated through proven peacebuilding practices, and can go on to build a different future for their country.”

In the Ukraine context, we echo the call of the Ukrainian Pacificist Movement for “open, inclusive and comprehensive negotiations on peace and disarmament in the format of a public dialogue between all state and non-state parties to the conflict with the participation of pro-peace civil society actors.” This type of inclusive process, a process that is not driven or dominated by those who created the crisis in the first place, must be applied to other contexts. We know that more inclusive processes lead to more stable peace, yet time after time, only men with guns dictate the terms of “peace”. These solutions invariably lead to the imposition of neoliberal economic policies, gender and racial oppressions and inequalities, and endless militarisation.

The old ways of doing things have proven over and over again that they do no work. We need a new vision of global peace, grounded in the intersectional experiences of people and the needs of the entire planet. Creating and achieving that vision requires changing who is invited to the table: out with the ruling elites, who are bound to personal interests and gains, and in with everyone who stands to lose from conflict. Land and water protectors, feminists, antinuclear activists, those organising for demilitarisation, equality, and care must lead the work for peace, not the people who profit from conflict.

Abolition for transformation

We need a paradigm shift in international relations, stemming from this kind of people-centred peace process. We need to alter the relations between United States and Russia, but more broadly we need to dismantle the militarised global order, militarised conceptions of security, and the dominance of the military-industrial complex over world affairs. The hegemony of colonial-corporate extractivism must also be transformed — for the climate, for relations with First Nations, for the protection of land, water, air, and animals.

An abolitionist framing is useful for cultivating such transformation. Instead of investing in weapons and preparing for war, we must be investing instead of care for people and planet. Abolition is a tool to build a world that works for all, instead of just a few. The abolition of war, globally, requires disarmament and arms control, systems for demilitarisation and reduction of military spending. But it also requires building structures for peace, solidarity, cooperation, and nonviolence to flourish. It means replacing weapons with renewable energy, war with diplomacy, capitalism with a redistributive feminist political economy that is centered on equality, social justice, degrowth and ecological sustainability.

Unlearning the necessity of violence is essential to exploring what could be built in its place. This means turning on its head so much of what we are taught about what’s necessary for safety and security in our world. It means learning to reject violence as a solution to all problems, interrogating and challenging systems of power that assert they exist to protect while instead they persecute and oppress.

### Framework---Competing Imaginaries---2NC

#### Evaluate competing imaginaries---the only question is if our assumptions are desirable. Policy frameworks make slavery and extinction inevitable.

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We must start by rejecting conventional foreclosures of the imagination. We cannot accept that politics is “the art of the possible” if the “possible” remains circumscribed by the play of current forces of stasis, confining the idea of change to policy shifts at the margin or—at the most ambitious—elite-driven national revolutions. The structures of state and market remain essentially untouched and continue to run the show. As long as these constraints are not removed, the Great Transition will be stymied. The first challenge is to find effective ways to subvert and transform these primordial structures. Meeting this challenge starts with liberating the mind from ingrained conventions that solidify the ideological biases of modernity.

If we carefully consider our own lives, we are likely to appreciate how many epochal public happenings had been previously deemed “impossible,” or only seemed possible after the fact. A potent illustration of the tyranny of a status quo bias is Winston Churchill’s derisive attitude toward Gandhi during the early stages of the rise of Indian nationalism. Dismissive of any threat to Indian colonial rule, Churchill described Gandhi as a “malignant subversive fanatic” and “a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the East, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceregal palace.” The great British war leader displayed his attachment to a Western understanding of power that had little insight into historical circumstances vulnerable to anti-colonial nationalism.

Similar patterns of the seemingly impossible happening are evident in contemporary history, such as the peaceful ending of the Cold War followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union; the American defeat in the Vietnam War despite overwhelming military superiority; China’s half-century rise from mass impoverishment and backwardness to prime geopolitical challenger, including threatening Western mastery of innovative technology such as AI, G5 connectivity, robotics, and genetic engineering; and the abandonment of apartheid by South Africa in the face of nonviolent resistance from within and anti-apartheid solidarity from without.

What these examples demonstrate is that our understanding of the scope of the possible has been artificially circumscribed in ways that protect the interests of various elites in the maintenance of the status quo, making it seem reckless and futile to mount structural challenges however justified they may be morally or bio-politically. Such foreclosures of imagined futures have been key to the protection of institutions like slavery, discrimination, and warfare but often remain limited in scope to specific locales or policy areas. The uniqueness of the Anthropocene is to restrict the possible to unsustainable and dysfunctional structures and modes of behavior, while bringing to a head the question of finding more viable ways of organizing life on the planet and living together in a manner that protects future generations.

Such foreclosures of the imagination inflict damage both by shortening our temporal vision and by constraining our understanding of useful knowledge. Despite what science and rationality tell us about the future, our leaders—and, indeed, most of us—give scant practical attention to what is needed to preserve and improve the life prospects for future generations. Given the scope and depth of the challenges, responsible anthropocentrism in the twenty-first century should incorporate a sense of urgency to temporal axes of concern. We now need a “politics of the impossible,” a necessary utopianism that stands as an avowal of the attainability of the Great Transition. We must begin by interrogating the semantics of the possible as a cultural, political, economic, and ideological construct binding humanity to a system that is increasingly bio-politically self-destructive for the species and its natural habitat.

Closely connected to this foreclosure of our temporal vision has been a scientifically conditioned epistemology asserting the limits of useful knowledge. Within the most influential epistemic communities, an Enlightenment ideology prevails that sets boundaries limiting productive intellectual inquiry. The positive legacies of the Enlightenment in grounding knowledge on scientifically verified evidence rather than cultural superstitions and religiously guided prejudice and dogma are real and important, but there have been costs as well. Notably, a bias against subjectivity discourages normative inquiry and advocacy, which is dismissed as “non-scientific.” The noted Confucian scholar Tu Wei-Ming has powerfully criticized the impact of what he calls “instrumental rationalism” on the capacity of Western civilization to embrace the value of empathy, which he views as integral to human dignity and humane governance.

We need a moral epistemology to achieve responsible anthropocentrism, exploring right and wrong, and distinguishing between desirable and diminished futures, not as matters of opinion, but as the underpinnings of “normative knowledge.” Universities, split into specialized disciplines and privileging work within the Enlightenment paradigm, are largely oblivious to the need for a holistic understanding of the complexities and solidarities with which we must grapple in order for humanity to extricate itself from present structures that divide and fragment the human experience, strangling possibilities.

It may be helpful to distinguish “the feasible,” “the necessary,” and “the desirable” to further illuminate “the pursuit of the impossible.” In short, “the feasible” from the perspective of the status quo seems incapable, under the best of circumstances, of achieving “the necessary” and “the desirable.” We will need to pursue “the desirable” to mobilize the capabilities needed to engage effectively in realizing “the necessary.”

If existing conditions continue, the bio-political destiny of the human species seems destined for dark times. In the past, before the Nuclear Age, we could ignore the future and address the material, security, and spiritual needs of bounded communities, and success or failure had no ramifications for larger systems. Now we must find ways to attend to the whole, or the parts will perish and likely destroy one another in the process. St. Francis found some fitting words for such an emancipatory path: “Start by doing what is necessary, then what is possible, and suddenly you are doing the impossible.”

### K Prior---Cybersecurity---2NC

#### Cybersecurity operates in societal power structures---evaluate the 1AC as a hegemonic project.

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Cyber-security practice is increasingly recognised as more than a technological exercise. The application of sociological and political viewpoints to such practice, particularly in organisations, is becoming more and more common, e.g., Burdon and Coles-Kemp (2019); Stevens (2016). In this paper, we build on these foundations by applying a number of lenses based on the work of Thomas Hobbes to a study of 15 Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and six senior organisational stakeholders representing 18 UK-based, but predominantly multinational, businesses. This work contributes to and extends cyber security scholarship by considering cyber security within business as a component of wider societal power structures. First, this research indicates that cyber security functions within businesses serve the interests of the state Leviathan. This positions those functions as indirect and possibly unwitting agents of the state, and cyber security itself as beneficial to the state and associated hegemonies. Second, it shows that cyber security functions within businesses operate as a Hobbesian form of control within the micro-societies of businesses, who are themselves mini-Leviathans. Third, it provides a novel sociological lens with which to explore cyber security within businesses and wider societies. We consider the key contribution of this research as being to provide a novel viewpoint on cyber-security practice that enables greater reflexivity and reflection for practitioners, as well as offering a pathway for future research.

### Link---Article 5/Deterrence---2NC

#### NATO’s Article 5 causes conflict---can’t address the root causes of war.

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NATO’s defense strategy is based on a belief in deterrence: threatening its opponents with violence and war with the aim of preventing it from attacking. Threats of violence are the alliance’s main tool and its whole starting point. The deterrence is based on military rearmament, which contributes to an armaments spiral, where no state wants to feel at a disadvantage and therefore equips itself as soon as an opponent does so. There is a great risk that the deterrence that is alleged to provide security instead leads to increased mistrust, more weapons in circulation, and a higher risk that armed conflict will actually break out. NATO membership risks dragging Sweden and Finland into this spiral of increasing uncertainty. Sustainable peace is not created through weapons and the military trained in warfare, but through negotiations, cooperation, diplomacy, and addressing the root causes of armed conflict.

### Link---Cyber Threats---2NC

#### The 1AC sells cyber threats to maintain the security state---threats are constructed not objective.

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5.3. Cyber security and the Leviathan(s)

It is not in the interests of a Hobbesian society to achieve “complete security” (Arendt, 2017 (1951, p. 184). Both the relative novelty of cyber-security threats and the continued emergence of new types of such threats, including the ‘sophisticated’ aspects thereof, can be viewed as “new props from the outside” (Arendt, 2017 (1951, p. 184) that stoke the flames of the possibility of war, particularly when attributed to nation states. These threats also offer “new and ever-growing fields for the honorable and profitable employment” (Hobson, 1900, p. 28) of citizens,28 particularly the bourgeoisie who are appeased by new job opportunities, and further stimulate consumption and growth (Arendt, 2017 (1951).

In a (post)modern world where threats to the state are less obvious or apparent, i.e., there is no obvious invader on the doorstep, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the inclination of the citizen towards obedience may be weaker. The state may, therefore, feel the need to motivate obedience by making it clear that it is still offering protection, but not against obvious invaders. Rather, it is against opaque, mysterious, and highly sophisticated threats, from which the state is providing protection. Not only do these threats need to be explained by specialists, due to their complexity, they also need to be ‘sold’ to citizens through education. It is even conceivable that such teachings could be contrary to “true Philosophy” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 703) but serve the benefit of the state, as well as securing the continued employment of the teacher (Arendt, 2006). This could motivate the embellishment of any threats communicated. It may be more advantageous for the state Leviathan to have such education delivered not through a state organ but rather through another component of society such as businesses. Rather than a conscious decision taken by the Leviathan this may be a fortuitous benefit, but one that it seeks to encourage through, e.g., communicating the ‘responsibility’ that businesses have in protecting wider society against cyber threats (Government, 2016).

Dedicated cyber-security functions support, and repeat, messages relating to a broader security agenda (Neocleous, 2008), both among a company’s employees and their customers. There is a wider security industry that “mustǪensure that security is never really achieved” (Neocleous, 2008, p. 156). This provides commercial benefits, as well as supporting an insecurity that is relied on by the state to achieve its aims (Neocleous, 2008), as previously noted by Arendt (2017 (1951). If states ultimately seek the perpetuation of (at least partial) insecurity, then it may be in their interests to define ‘security’ in an insecure manner, at the same time encouraging organisations and wider society to achieve a level of ‘insecure security’. Recent attempts by governments to weaken or circumvent strong encryption, e.g. Google (2019); Thomson (2019), some successful, e.g. Taylor (2019), can be argued as demonstrating this desire.29 In addition, motivating organisations to operate a cyber-security function that inures employees, who are also citizens, to increased and intrusive surveillance and monitoring may also contribute to this same “insecure security”, albeit potentially providing associated benefits to those employees, such as greater privacy.

### Link---Democracy Promotion---2NC

#### Promoting American constitutional democracy is imperialist---it assumes the inevitability and supremacy of the West.

Richard Falk 09. Emeritus Int’l Law @ Princeton Achieving Human Rights p. 52-53

The transition to a regulated structure of world order is underway and is assured unless a catastrophic breakdown occurs, due to ecological, economic, or political collapse. That is, the Westphalian form of world order, based on the state system, while resilient, is essentially being displaced from above and below. It is not only the case that the main struggle since 9/11 is being waged by a global state on the one side and a loosely linked headless network on the other side; the impact of multi-dimensional globalization is also making borders less important in most respects (although more important in some-for instance, restricting transnational migrants). And normative developments are now associated with international accountability for gross violations of human rights and for the commission of such crimes as genocide, torture, and ethnic cleansing. Much of the literature that recognizes this emergent global governance stresses the inevitability of American leadership. The mainstream debate is whether this leadership will take a cooperative, economic form as it did in the 1990s or move in direction of the unilateralist, coercive form of the early years of the twenty-first century.36 The outcome of the November 2004 American presidential elections, together with the impact of the purported transfer of sovereignty to Iraq on June 30, 2004, as well as the anti-war outcome of the 2006 congressional elections seemed to supply a short-term answer. The main argument being made seems likely to be unaffected by a change in the elected leadership of the United States, although the 2008 presidential elections might produce some tactical adjustments associated with the high costs of continuing the Iraq War. Either foreign policy path is essentially Orientalist in the sense of building a future world order on the basis of American interests, an American worldview, and an American model of constitutional democracy. Neither is sensitive, in the slightest, to the ordeal of the Palestinian people, and thus bitter resentments directed at the United States will be kept alive, especially in the Arab world. International law will continue to play a double role, facilitating the pretensions of the American model of "democracy" as an expression of a commitment to the realization of international human rights and offering opponents of this model legal standards and principles by which to validate their anti-imperial, antiAmerican resistance. In my view, only a non-Orientalist reshaping of global governance can be beneficial for the peoples of the world and sustainable over time. In that process, the de-Orientalizing of the normative order is of paramount importance, providing positive images of accountability, participation, and justice that do not universalize the mythic or existential realities of the American experience and that draw fully upon the creative energies and cultural worldviews of the diverse civilizations that together constitute the world. Such expectations may presently seem utopian , but that is only because our horizons are now clouded by warmongering "realists" and global imperialists. To dream freely of a benevolent future is the only way to encourage the moral and political imagination of people throughout the world to take responsibility for their own future, thereby repudiating in the most decisive way the deforming impacts of Orientalism in all of its sinister forms.

#### Democracy promotion assumes a universal Western subject

David Trubek and Alvaro Santos 06. Trubek Law @ Wisconsin and Santos Law @ Texas [The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal eds. Trubek and Santos p. 17-18]

False universalism Another feature of the new critical practice is the challenge it poses to the idea that there is one model of development and thus one model for law in development. At the height of the neoliberal Moment, Margaret Thatcher issued her famous dictum that “there is no alternative” and the development agencies of that time adopted the so-called “Washington Consensus,” which preached market fundamentalism and economic integration as the solution for all countries. In the legal sphere, this view led to what Newton calls “prescriptive transplantism” in which Western legal models are imposed on transitional and developing countries. Although Third Moment development thinking has expanded to include issues of democracy and the social, and to recognize the need for limited interventionism, the development agencies still are largely committed to the idea that there is one basic model that should be followed by all developing and transition countries. While revisionist mainstream thinkers accept the need for limited differences and sequencing of reforms, the critics seek to challenge the continued adherence to a basic universalism and suggest the possibility of alternative development paths and legal models. The hegemony of the world economic order The new critical practice questions the relationship between the legal systems of developing and transition countries and the hegemony of the world economic order. Although the focus of critical practice is on the policies of the development agencies, critics recognize that their actions are only one of many international forces that affect the legal orders of developing and transition economies. These legal orders are affected by trade regimes like the W orld Trade Organization (WTO) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), by the role played by transnational legal actors, by cultural flows, and other factors. To the extent that these forces constrain alternatives to a one-size-fits-all model of capitalism, critics seek to expose their impact and question their necessity. The possibility of contestation Fundamental to the critical practice is the desire to open things up for challenge and contestation. Contributors to this volume believe that more equitable and fairer approaches to development are possible. They think that legal rules, practice, culture, and consciousness are arenas in which false universalism and appeal to professional expertise can be contested and alternatives proposed. They all hope that this volume will encourage such contestation. CONCLUSION The current literature reveals several very different approaches to law and development that contrast with the argument of this volume. The first are the “chastened neoliberals” who think that minor adjustments in the neoliberal model, plus better implementation of reforms, are all that is needed. Included in that group are those who see the problems as largely technical, simply requiring better indicators and more empirical studies to perfect the model. The second are those who think that all that we need is a turn to a holistic view of development to fully implement the move to the social and the embrace of policy analysis and public law formalism. In contrast, these essays suggest that the practice of law and development must pay close attention to issues of distribution, question the alleged neutrality of both policy analysis and public law formalism, and explore alternative models of development and the role law might play in advancing them.

#### Rule of law depoliticizes global life---the narrow ideological spectrum of legal experts eliminates space for contestation.

Duncan Kennedy 06. Law @ Harvard [The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal eds. Trubek and Santos p. 171-173]

Focus on the rule of law as a development strategy fits well with a resistance among today’s center and center-left students to think of themselves as rulers, making contestable distributive choices with real consequences. Partly this represents a retreat from the cold realization that policy making breaks eggs, imposes costs, intervenes in foreign places with a view to changing them. One encounters instead the vague sentiment that getting governance right, injecting the rule of law, enforcing human rights, will somehow bring a softer gentler development graciously in its wake. Partly the resistance to rulership arises from the intuition that political and economic debates about what development is and how to make it happen have not generated a technical consensus on how to bring about development. As a result, focus on politics or economics places the ruler in the awkward position of having to choose in a way that will have consequences that cannot be accurately predicted or guaranteed—but will undoubtedly make some people worse off. This makes people who aspire to act from expertise uncomfortable. The “rule of law” promises an alternative—a domain of expertise, a program for action—that obscures the need for distributional choices or for clarity about how distributing things one way rather than another will, in fact, lead to development. Unfortunately, this turns out to be a false promise. The focus on rights, constitutions, government capacity, or judicial independence may all be to the good—but without a sharp sense for how one is intending to affect the economy, it is hard to compare building the rule of law with leaving the economy to operate more informally, and hard to compare building the rule of law one way with building it another. In this, the focus on law as a development policy shares a great deal with other efforts to replace political and economic thinking with a general appeal to technical expertise and ideas about best practice. The result, by default or design, is a narrowing of the ideological range. Political choices fade from view—as do choices among different economic ideas about how development happens or what it implies for social, political, and economic life. Where once there might have been ideological and theoretical contestation, there is a somewhat muddy consensus. It need not be this way. One could focus on law in ways that sharpened attention to distributional choices and rendered more precise the consequences of different economic theories of development.The choices between import substitution and export-led growth, or between neoliberal marketbased development and strategies of either import or export promotion, offer the opportunity for sharp debate about economic theory and political preferences. Even during periods of broad consensus—on import substitution or neoliberalism—there were numerous implementation decisions to be made that required both economic theory and political commitment. The choices within and between regimes are made and implemented in legal terms. In short, development strategy requires a detailed examination of the distributional choices effected by various legal rules and regimes to determine, as best one can, their likely impact on growth and development. It requires that we identify the choices that might lead to different development paths and compare them in social, political, and economic terms—even if we lack a strong consensus or decisive expertise about how to make them. One makes policy to distribute—by price or administrative action—hoping to allocate resources to their most productive, most developmentally promising, use. It is unfortunate that there is no distributional recipe for development, but that is our situation. There are contending ideas, contending interests, contested theories, and complex unknowables.Not knowing,we must decide.We might even experiment. The law should be a terrain for these inquiries and a site for this experimentation—not a substitute for them. Building a legal regime involves choices that distribute differently and contribute to development in different ways. Sometimes, no doubt, increasingly formal legal rules would be a good idea. Sometimes less governmental discretion, sometimes more vigorous criminal enforcement, broader distribution of supply relationships, less local preference in contracting, all might be very helpful. But sometimes we would also expect the opposite. The emergence of the rule of law as a development strategy has become an unfortunate substitute for engagement with the politics and economics of development policy making.

### Link---Other Powers/Democracy---2NC

#### Framing other powers as “evil” and the West as the “defender of democracy” makes war inevitable---Iraq, Libya, and Yemen proves.

Ronan Burtenshaw 2/26/22. Editor of Tribune. "Socialists Fight for a Future Without War". Jacobin. 2-26-2022. https://jacobinmag.com/2022/02/antiwar-movement-uk-ukraine-russia-nato

One lesson is this: we must be able to criticize our own governments. The path to war is paved with the nationalist mythologies of great powers and the impunity of their leaders. In Russia’s case, this has been on clear display in recent days, with Putin’s hour-long lectures laying out a particularly distorted version of history. But it isn’t only in Russia where great powers have mythologies and leaders go to war with impunity.

In Britain, our leaders have invaded sovereign states without provocation. They did in Iraq in 2003, taking part in the killing of hundreds of thousands. The people who lied to take us into that war faced no consequences. Their careers continued, as did their luxurious lives, as an entire region of the world was plunged into the depths of hell for decades. We are still living with its consequences today, including here in Britain, whether it be the refugee crisis or the restriction of civil liberties brought about by the “war on terror.”

But they did not only do it in Iraq. We hear very little today about Britain’s role in the NATO-led war in Libya in 2011, which demolished that state, left its people in the hands of warlords, and pushed thousands to flee and drown in the Mediterranean. Nor do we hear about Britain’s complicity in the ongoing war in Yemen, conducted by our ally Saudi Arabia with our weapons, £17.6 billion of which have been provided by BAE systems to the Saudis since 2015. The United Nations estimates that 377,000 Yemenis have died in that conflict.

These lives are not any less or any more important than the lives of Ukrainians. We should fight to end all of these wars, and all of the wars yet to come.

One thing is for certain: we will not end war by saying that our side represents virtue and the other side represents evil. But that is the mythology we swallow from our leaders and media in the West every single day. Ever since the Cold War, the West has framed itself as a defender of democracy and freedom of expression across the globe. Liberal opinion in our home countries has repeated this ad nauseam. But it was hardly ever true.

Even in Russia, when the Cold War ended and the West reigned supreme and unchallenged across the face of the earth, the West could not and would not stand up for democracy. It intervened brazenly in the 1996 Russian election to help the fraudsters who won it for Boris Yeltsin, a result that in many ways paved the way for the Russia we see today.

### Link---Preparation for War/Deterrence---2NC

#### Must end war---preparation is self-defeating---only the alts movements solve.

Mauri Cruz 3/4/22. Lawyer, director of the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (Abong) and coordinator of the Seed Project. "The World Social Forum and the Peace Agenda". Middle East Monitor. 3-4-2022. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220304-the-world-social-forum-and-the-peace-agenda/

The world is terrified to watch the war in Ukraine, which has global importance because it involves the second largest nuclear power. But the world did not go to war with Russian military operations. There are other wars going on, though not reported. Starting with the unauthorised UN occupation of Palestine, the Israeli military killed 219 Palestinians, including 63 children in May 2021 alone. There is also the war in Yemen that continues to claim lives every day and with more than 20 million people in need of humanitarian aid, without access to water or food; the war in Myanmar, where in a peaceful demonstration, in March 2021, more than 500 people were murdered by the military and it is a conflict that mobilises powerful economic interests, especially in the United Kingdom, a country of which Myanmar is a former colony; the war in Syria that has already left 500,000 people dead, half of them civilians and that the opposition to the government receives military support from the US and European countries.

In addition to these, there are numerous regional conflicts, almost all financed by the US war industry and countries like the United Kingdom and Israel. The reality is that the world has been in wars since the end of World War II. Lists circulating on social media show that, since then, only the US has declared war, sending weapons, armoured vehicles, helicopters, missiles and thousands of soldiers against more than 50 countries in all parts of the world.

The logic of war is morally based on the idea that it is lawful for human beings to murder other human beings to defend their own rights. Therefore, people, groups, collectives and countries arm themselves and the United Nations itself defends the principle of self-protection. This practice, however, creates a spiral of violence. If a country arms itself to "feel" safe, neighbouring countries will feel threatened and, necessarily, will arm themselves to protect their security. The practice of war, therefore, is nefarious and ineffective by its own logic. The more a country arms itself to defend itself, the more other countries will arm themselves and insecurity will increase, in an endless spiral.

Logic tells us the opposite way. The way out is disarmament. But for that, it is necessary to dismantle the war industry, the main economic "asset" of the US and Israel. In fact, wars have everything to do with capitalism. During World War II, the US remained "neutral", if it could, building a powerful war industry and military inputs to, so to speak, fuel the conflict. After 1945, this industry was strengthened with the cold war and with several wars supported by US governments, such as in Vietnam and Korea. Regrettably, common sense indicates that if the US were to declare war on Ukraine, there would be no surprises and the event would be within the normal range. After all, the US government, with the connivance of the UN, is treated as a global army, free to carry out atrocities without international reprisals.

On the other hand, despite being a nuclear power, Russia was not having the same behaviour. The very annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation took place, not on its own initiative, but because of the Ukrainian civil war after the 2014 coup. Hence, the surprise of most people with the Russian initiative towards Ukraine. However, in this case, Russia chose the wrong path, because the logic that fuels this conflict is the logic of war, where there is no right side. Russia, on the grounds of self-defence, wants to impose its protection rules on Ukraine. Ukraine, in logic of serving as an instrument of NATO and the USA, seeks to strengthen its military and political power, threatening Russia. More than that, in both countries, what fuels the conflict is an ultranationalist sentiment that has, as its moral basis, the denial of the other, a phenomenon that in Ukraine is amplified with Nazi-fascist elements.

What is certain is that the outcome of this crisis will not be promising for humanity. Even if the conflict ends in the next few days, the trend will be an increase in arms policy in all countries, as Germany has already decided by tripling its military budget. Everything indicates that other countries will follow the same path. In this moment of enormous challenges, the worst scenario is the increase in military tensions and the breakdown of global alliances for peace. The world should be mobilised to face the pandemic that costs thousands of lives daily, to combat global warming and its effects on the lives of people and the planet, to combat the inequalities that generate millions of deaths from hunger, lack of access to water, health, sanitation, housing, work and a basic income.

The World Social Forum has always been a privileged space for civil society, autonomously in relation to its governments and with a perspective of universal citizenship. It is up to the WSF to stand against all wars – against the wars in Ukraine, Yemen, Palestine, Syria and Myanmar. Promote a global internationalist movement in defence of peace and for a new world order. If global citizenship does not revolt against its rulers, escalating arms will dominate the agenda for decades to come, with unimaginable consequences. It is a very big challenge, for sure. But a necessity that imposes itself.

I repeat here what I already wrote in 2012, when the Free Palestine WSF took place in Porto Alegre: the WSF was born with a radically democratic path, where there are no institutional hierarchies that overlap the rights of people and universal citizenship. It was born with a methodology of dialogue and consensus, where the most diverse and different points of view are free to be presented, heard and criticised. It is not the place of single thought or absolute truths. In the WSF, many new struggles arose, many social subjects emerged from invisibility and the horizons of human and social rights were expanded.

It is this new political culture that can offer a democratic perspective and dialogue as a way of confronting conflicts. The WSF defends the right of peoples to self-determine, to build autonomous and democratic states and, in the same way, believes that it is possible to create a context of peaceful coexistence among all peoples. We place ourselves in the field of peace building. Global citizenship needs peace and must mobilise to demand it.

It takes a good dose of solidarity and empathy to understand what is happening right now. It is necessary to seek common points for the conflict to end and for it to end in a respectful and dignified way for all sides. Defending peace is our main mission these days. I sincerely hope that we can.

#### The presumption of acceptable wars to stop wars puts a bandaid on a global hemorrhage---only ending militarization can solve.

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What is happening right now over Ukraine is bigger than Ukraine. Tectonic shifts in global geopolitics are taking place and Ukraine is but one field of “play” for the heavily militarised states. Gamesmanship between the United States and China is on the rise; proxy wars, occupations and aggression, and military and economic pressure is occuring throughout the world; extraction primarily by the global north and exploitation of the so-called global south is rampant, exacerbating and accelerating poverty and inequalities and environmental devestation; militarism and military spending is on the rise globally. Approaching the situation in Ukraine without recognising this larger context is like applying a bandaid to a global hemorrage. It is a piece of a much bigger puzzle: of a world order dictated and dominated by the militarised elite.

This is a world order that sees war as a legitimate means to an end. It celebrates militarised masculinities, empowering the culture of militarism and violence as brave and noble pursuits, while rendering invisible the gendered and racialised harms of militarism. It is a world order that uses a technostrategic language to sanitise the image of war. Think tanks and politicians, media, and war gamers act as if countries are chess pieces and people are numbers on a page. US government officials, for example, have estimated that a war in Ukraine could kill 25,000 to 50,000 civilians, 5,000 to 25,000 Ukrainian military personnel, and 3,000 to 10,000 Russian soldiers. The fighting since 2014, in eastern Ukraine it should be noted, has already killed more than 14,000 people and displaced millions.

Instead of seeing these people as individuals, whose lives have value and meaning, who are part of families and communities, the number crunchers calculate “acceptable loss” and risks of “collateral damage,” and look the other way as the bodies pile up. Also accounted for is the disruption to daily life — the interruption of education, of food production, of supply chains; the destruction of hospitals, homes, markets, water and sanitation facilitations, and all of the other critical infrastructure that people rely on to survive. These numbers don’t take into account the psychological terror of living in conflict, of hearing bombs dropped or drones hovering overhead, of being afraid to leave your house, of watching loved ones die. These figures also don’t take into account the environmental impacts of war, the toxic or explosive remnants of weapons, the damage to land and water and animals.

These humanitarian and environmental impacts should be at the forefront of all policy making decisions. Yet they are completely ignored by those talking in board rooms in capital cities far from where the harm will be felt, deciding what choices to make for the sake of “geopolitical strategy” or “balance of power”.

The urgency of demilitarisation and disarmament

This must change. Instead of encouraging the sending of more weapons and soldiers into this situation, instead of justifying the militarism of one side because of the other, we must instead strive to de-escalate this crisis through disarmament, demilitarisation, and diplomacy.

### IL---Imperialism/Freedom---2NC

#### Permanent emergency restricts freedom for security---never ending threats require the imperialist State to wage war and accumulate power.

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Permanent emergency, warfare and power. Within the domain of International Relations (IR), the concept of permanent emergency has been established and discussed by a number of scholars, e.g. Neocleous (2008). This refers to the perpetuation of a state of threat, whereby a population’s security, and often its way of life, are subject to, or positioned as being subject to, various forms of continuing menace. This environment facilitates the establishment of various responses to those threats that restrict the freedoms of citizens, in the name of ‘security’ (Bubandt, 2005, Neocleous, 2008), a concept which has many parallels with Hobbes’ state of nature.

In a Hobbesian society, there is a never-ending need for the state to expand its power; “only by constantly extending its authority and only through the process of power accumulation can it remain stable” (Arendt, 2017 (1951, p. 184). If such a society were to achieve “complete security”, then the state’s power would crumble (Arendt, 2017 (1951, p. 184). Therefore, there is a need for the continual provision of “new props from the outside” (Arendt, 2017 (1951, p. 184), such as novel threats. The “ever-present possibility of war guarantees the Commonwealth a prospect of permanence because it makes it possible for the state to increase its power at the expense of other states” (Arendt, 2017 (1951, p. 184-5). According to Hobbes, “[i]t is rationally required to seek peace, but when peace is unattainable it is rationally allowed to wage war” (Gert, 2001, p. 245). Arendt further elaborates the need for a “never-ending accumulation of power [as being] necessary for the protection of a never-ending accumulation of capital” (Arendt, 2017 (1951, p. 186) and how this has underpinned imperialism and indeed modern society.4

### XT---Security Impact---2NC

#### Securitized governmentality creates bare life and Global Civil War---threat strips life to parts that are maximized through mastery and destruction.

Brad Evans 10. Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations. “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War and Violence in the 21st Century”. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.886.8380&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Duffield’s principal message here is clear and provocative: Liberalism proceeds on the basis that ‘Others’ are the problem to be solved. With politics therefore becoming the handmaiden of necessity, mired in the instrumental pursuit of power, any form of political subjectivity that stands against the technical recovery of the good life is necessarily rendered dangerous for the greater social good. This is significant. Since de-politicization is said to occur when life is being primed for its own betterment – that is, within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices – it is possible to offer an alternative reflection on Agamben’s bare life. Bare life for Agamben is seen to be a product of the sovereign encounter. Life, in other words, becomes bare since it is beyond the recourse of any legal frameworks/obligations – hence set outside (‘abandoned’ in Agamben’s terms) the juridical protections that normally guarantee the subject a place in our moral and political universe of obligation. What Duffield implicitly suggests, however, is that the bare life of the biopolitical encounter is the product of a different logic. No longer banished from the realm, life is denied its political quality as the ‘bare essentials’ for species survival take precedence. No longer then made bare in order to be rendered inactive to the society it endangers, life is stripped bare of its pre-existing values on the basis that those precise qualities impede its potential productive salvation. Hence, while this life is equally assumed to be without meaningful political quality – though in this instance because of some dangerous lack of fulfilment – permitting the restitution in the life of the body implies that exceptional politics are displaced by the no less imperial and no less politically charged bare activity of species survival. Barely active life accordingly has not only become the privileged object of global security governance. Global battle lines are effectively drawn around its hollowed-out form in order to gain mastery over the productive spoils of global existence.

The Liberal War Thesis

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in mapping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace:

However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7).

While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the ontotheological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cultures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/­soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited:

Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162).

Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important departure. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below).

Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name:

At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15).

What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled:

political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15).

David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philosophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment:

NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means.

Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war therefore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counter-­ insurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counterinsurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/developmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast.

### AT: Extinction Outweighs---2NC

#### “Extinction outweighs” framing creates global racialized violence---securing life requires eliminating threat.

Brad Evans 10. Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations. “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War and Violence in the 21st Century”. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.886.8380&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Necessary Violence

Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living:

Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137).

When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While killing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening:

When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-power’ or ‘bio-politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’.

### Alt Solvency---Transnational Threats---2NC

#### Threats are transnational---only the alternatives shift to global solidarity can solve.

Richard Falk 21. Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University and Fellow of the Orfalea Center of Global Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. “Global Solidarity: Toward a Politics of Impossibility.” Opening Essay for a GTI Forum. https://greattransition.org/gti-forum/global-solidarity-falk

Global Solidarity Must Rise as the Great Transition Unfolds

Without global solidarity, the structural features of the status quo will remain too deeply entrenched to allow a more cooperative, peaceful, just, and ecologically mindful world to emerge. Such a benevolent future is blocked by the prevailing consciousness in government and corporate board rooms, a paralyzing blend of ignorance, denial, incrementalism, and most of all, an unconscious respect for and deference to fragmenting boundaries that make global solidarity seem “impossible” to achieve. Assuming the paralysis has been overcome by an enhanced conception of the possible, then what?

Global solidarity would benefit humanity functionally, ethically, ecologically, and spiritually. Its functional role is most immediately obvious from a problem-solving perspective. Whether we consider vaccine diplomacy, climate change, or nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that only on the basis of human solidarity will we treat vaccines in the midst of epidemics or pandemics as part of the global commons rather than as a source of national diplomacy, international property rights, and pharmaceutical profits. With climate change, whether we will manage a displacement of national and financial interests on the basis of general global well-being depends on achieving an unprecedented level of global solidarity. Similarly, with nuclear weapons, will we find the courage to live without such weaponry within a security framing that represents the well-being of people rather than the shortsighted hegemony of a few governments and their self-regarding societal elites?

### Alt---AT: Unrealistic---2NC

#### Abolition changes the parameters of what is realistic---history proves.

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The value of being “unrealistic”

The abolition of nuclear weapons, of war, of borders, of all the structures of state violence that we can see clearly at play in this conflict is at the core of the demand for real, lasting, paradigm-shifting change that we need in the world. It can feel like vast, overwhelming, and inconceivable. But most change is inconceivable until we achieve it.

Even in the midst of crisis, we need to plant the seeds for peace. If the broader context of what led to war is not addressed, if the process to achieve peace itself is not feminist, does not put human and planetary well-being at its centre, then we will be find ourselves right back here again as we have so many times before.

Many will say that doing anything other than sending more weapons or bolstering global militarism is “unrealistic” as a response to this crisis. But it is the credibility of the militarists that must be put in question in this moment, not those working to build the structures and culture for peace, cooperation, and well-being.

Everyone who has ever tried to do anything progressive throughout all of history has been accused of being unrealistic. The only reason change has ever been occurred in the world is because people ignored those criticisms and kept working. Change is not bestowed upon us by benevolent leaders. Change is compelled, by people. Being “unrealistic” means being on the front line of change. It means helping to alter what people conceive of as unrealistic, who they see as credible to speak or act on an issue. And ultimately, it means helping to dismantle the systems of harm and oppression and building something better.

### Alt---AT: Ukraine---2NC

#### Justifying militarism with Ukraine sanitizes war---only the alt causes true peaceful solutions.

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Dedication to war, indifference to peace

The doubling down on the militarisation that is piggybacking on the Russian invasion of Ukraine has led us to a point where war has become sanitised, perhaps even glorified; a point where our empathy and desire to stop criminal and aggressive acts of Putin has become co-opted into the militarised and binary ways of the political and economic elite, where the only option presented is more escalation, never de-escalation, never dialogue and negotiations. It has brought us to a point where nonviolent voices are actively silenced and where peacebuilders are being dismissed, or even worse, made into villains.